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ABSTRACT 
A THREAT LOOMS LARGE:  
CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 1989-2011 
China’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia regarding the South China Sea disputes 
has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. Following the end of 
the Cold War, China transformed from a previous hostile and antagonistic stance 
towards Southeast Asian countries to a friendlier approach which is usually 
termed as a ‘good neighbor policy’. Many scholars especially constructivists 
therefore argue that China has changed its identity to become a benign rising 
power. Since 2010, however, China has again changed its diplomatic approach and 
became even more aggressive in its claims in the South China Sea disputes. Why 
was there such a dramatic change in China’s regional foreign policy? 
Constructivists remain silent in answering this question. This study argues that the 
change of power distribution between China and other states in Southeast Asia is 
the major driving force that has facilitated change in Beijing’s diplomatic approach 
to this region since the end of the Cold War. Through a historical analysis within 
an offensive realist theoretical framework, this study concludes that China’s 
change of its diplomatic approach is mainly driven by change of power distribution 
in the region, or in other words, by realist factors.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background to the Study 
Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia has substantially changed since the end of 
the Cold War. In 1991, after the Chinese Foreign Minister was invited by Malaysia 
to the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur, relations 
between China and ASEAN were normalized. From 1992 to 1995, China attended 
AMMs as a guest of the ASEAN Chair. In 1996, China became a regular dialogue 
partner of ASEAN. In 1997 Chinese President Jiang Zemin and ASEAN leaders 
inaugurated the first ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) 
meeting (Ba, 2003, P. 626). In 2001, at the ASEAN plus China meeting, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the creation of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(Chung, 2009, P. 13). 
Those changes in China’s foreign policy relative to ASEAN combined with other 
moves by Beijing in resolving territorial disputes including the bilateral maritime 
boundary agreement with Vietnam in 2001, China’s signing of the “Declaration of 
Conduct in the SCS” (DOC-SCS) with ASEAN in 2002, as well as its agreement in 
2005 to conduct joint tests for seismic activities in the region (Jiping, 2007, P. 15) 
had a profound impact on regional stability and regional economic growth.  
China’s trade with ASEAN states has grown fast. In 1978, China’s trade with the 
five original ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
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Philippines) amounted to only US $859 million (Shiliang, 1993, P. 3). By 2004, 
however, this number had increased to over US $100 billion, a year ahead of a 
previously set target. Two-way trade between China and ASEAN saw a 23 percent 
increase in 2005, reaching $130.4 billion (Xinhua, 2006). This number continued to 
grow and reached $202.6 billion in 2007, an increase of 25.9 per cent over the 
past year (Liang, 2008). By then, ASEAN constituted the fourth largest export 
market for China (Cui, 2007, P. 51). 
Many analysts now argue that China has become a “good neighbor” to South East 
Asian states and  its diplomatic approach has been recently labeled as a “good 
neighbor diplomacy” (Tingchang, 2001, Zhu, 2009, Chung, 2009). According to 
various scholars, notably constructivists, China’s rise should not be regarded as a 
threat. Instead, the rise of China should be viewed as an opportunity for mutual 
economic benefit and regional development.     
Events in 2010 and 2011, however, have cast doubt on this interpretation. China 
reportedly claimed the South China Sea (SCS) as a “core interest” (Wong, 2010, 
Yoshihara and Holmes, 2011) on par with Tibet and Taiwan, opening the possibility 
of using force in resolving disputes in that area. This escalation provides new 
insights into China’s aggressive behavior toward the SCS. 
In March 2011, China warned against any oil exploration in waters it claimed in 
the SCS (Calica, 2011). Two months later, the China Marine Surveillance service 
announced it would expand by 1,000 officers, to more than 10,000 (United Press 
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International, 2011). Most symbolically, on August 10, 2011, China’s first aircraft 
carrier began its sea trials (Wines, 2011).  
While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) builds up its capabilities, Beijing’s policy-
leaders continue to press their sovereignty claims. In December 2009, Beijing 
established local government bodies known as ‘hamlet committees’ on Woody 
Island - the largest island in the Paracels group. One month later, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress approved the Law on Sea Island 
Protection (Raine, 2011, P. 74). This legislation establishes broad administrative 
responsibilities over all claimed islands for the nominal purpose of protecting their 
eco-systems and promoting sustainable development. Such jurisdictional and 
institutional frameworks have been used by Beijing as pretexts to bolster its 
strategic presence and thereby promote its claims in contested waters.   
In response, some of China’s neighbours, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, 
who have the most overlapping claims with China in the SCS, have condemned 
China’s claims. On June 9, 2011, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
made an unprecedentedly strong statement in defence of national sovereignty 
after two cable cutting incidents occurred between China and Vietnam on May 25 
and June 9 respectively. He said, “we continue to affirm strongly and to manifest 
the strongest determination of all the Party, of all the people and of all the army in 
protecting Vietnamese sovereignty in maritime zones of the country.” (Agence 
France-Presse, 2011). At the same time, Philippine President Aquino also lobbied 
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other Southeast Asian countries to unify as a bloc on a detailed code of conduct to 
approach China (Thayer, 2011b, P. 9). What are the implications of all these recent 
events? Should China be regarded as a good neighbor in Southeast Asia or should 
it be regarded as a threat?  
There are a large number of studies explaining China’s foreign policy toward 
Southeast Asian countries and specifically regarding the SCS disputes. Many of 
these works assess the correlation between China’s military power and its foreign 
policy towards the SCS. However, these studies mainly focus on explaining and 
discussing Beijing’s “good neighbour policy” following the end of the Cold War. 
Less analysis has been offered on the reason why there has been a substantial 
change in China’s foreign policy in the SCS since 2010. Also, little attention has 
been given to the correspondence between China’s good neighbour policy after 
the end of the Cold War and its recent change in diplomatic approach. This 
represents a gap in the knowledge required for better understanding of Chinese 
foreign policy. This thesis aims to fill this gap by exploring the inter-relationship 
between China’s military capabilities and its foreign policy in the SCS during the 
period of 1989-2009 as well as between 2010-2011. 
To do so, it seeks to answer several important questions concerning China’s 
foreign policy on the SCS disputes. First, what drove China’s good neighbour policy 
in Southeast Asia during the period of 1989-2009? To what extent did the 
distribution of power in the SCS impact Beijing’s foreign policy in the region during 
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this period? Second, was there a substantial change in Beijing’s diplomatic 
approach in Southeast Asia since 2010 and what explains this apparent change? 
Does the distribution of power to the advantage of China prompt Beijing to act 
more aggressively? Lastly, what is the impact of Beijing’s change of its diplomatic 
approach during the two periods under review to regional security?  To answer 
these questions, a historical approach within realist theoretical framework is 
undertaken to (1) identify and explain the causes of change in China’s regional 
foreign policy in the SCS since the end of the Cold War; and (2) determine the 
effects of these changes in China’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia on regional 
security.  
Current Debates on China’s Rise and its Foreign Policy  
The debate on the rise of China could be generally divided into two schools of 
thought, namely constructivism and realism. Constructivists emphasize subjective 
social factors over material factors to explain China’s rise. According to 
constructivists, interstate relations are largely shaped by identities, norms and 
strategic cultures, not by rational choices that reflect objective, material benefits 
such as trade and investment ties, international institutions, or a military balance 
of power (Wendt, 1999). Constructivists believe that states will be ‘socialized’ 
through repeated interactions with each other. This process will generate norms 
and rules and thereby foster a collective identity, which in turn will shape the 
behaviour of the participants. Because constructivists view interstate relations as 
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social relationships which are largely malleable, they tend to be optimistic about 
international security (Friedberg, 2005, P. 34). 
In the case of China, constructivists argue that the socialization of that country has 
taken place during interactions with ASEAN. During these interactions, it is argued, 
Beijing has realized that its national interests could be better achieved through 
cooperation with ASEAN rather than confrontation against it (Yunling and Shiping, 
2005). In other words, as a result of regional interaction, China has transformed its 
identity and shifted from norm-avoiding to norm-affirming behavior in its relations 
with ASEAN (Xuefeng, 2005, P. 300).  Constructivists therefore conclude that 
because of an evolution in its identity, Beijing has a strong desire to become 
involved in regional cooperation with its neighboring states in Southeast Asia.  
These arguments, however, suffer from three major defects. First, constructivists 
fail to designate reliable indicators to observe and measure the transformation of 
China’s identity. The indicator constructivists largely focus on is China’s good 
neighbor policy. However, China’s good neighbour policy is exactly the 
phenomenon that needs to be explained by the change of Beijing’s identity. As 
noted by Sun Xuefeng, “On the one hand, this explanation holds that the reason 
why China reassures South-East Asian states lies in the transformation of China’s 
identity, and on the other hand it argues that China’s reassurance policy indicates 
the change of China’s identity” (Xuefeng, 2005, p. 301). It is clear that 
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constructivists’ argument about China’s transformation of identity is tautological 
and fails to separate the causal factor and its consequences.  
Second, it is also not persuasive to claim that China’s good neighbour policy is 
motivated by China’s change of identity because this policy could also be 
motivated by other factors, especially its national security interests. As discussed 
below, China is not a mindless aggressor, it is a calculating national security actor. 
China knows that the best way for it to further advance its interests is to have a 
good relationship with neighboring states. As such, while constructivists claim that 
China’s change of its national identity drives its good neighbor policy, it is also 
possible to claim that this policy is mainly driven by realist factors.  
Third, constructivism seems to provide an explanation for Beijing’s good neighbor 
policy from 1989 to 2009 when China focused extensively on economic 
development. But it arguably struggles to explain the shift in 2010 towards a more 
assertive policy. Why was there such a substantial change in China’s diplomatic 
approach to the SCS disputes? What were the causes of these changes? 
Constructivists remain silent in answering these questions.  
For realists, nation-states exist as units in an anarchical international order and 
the system largely determines the behaviour of states. Defensive realism, notably 
Waltz (Waltz, 1979) maintains that states will acquire military power to ensure 
their security, but, because of being mindful of security dilemma, states will stop 
once they have enough power, so as not to worry their neighbours. Offensive 
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realists, notably Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2002), however, argue that the 
security dilemma does not restrain states from acquiring more power because, in 
basic terms, attack is the best form of defence. Therefore acquiring greater 
offensive capabilities is a precondition for being secure. According to offensive 
realism, states will pursue expansion as they grow stronger (Labs, 1997, Zakaria, 
1998, Mearsheimer, 2002, Elman, 2004). Because power is the ultimate source of 
security in an anarchic world, states will pursue expansion to achieve hegemony 
(Mearsheimer, 2002, P. 40).  
There is an extensive and growing realist literature on China. Richard Bernstein 
and Ross Munro (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, 1998) was one of the first such 
works that generated extensive debate. They argue that a combination of 
systemic, domestic, and historical factors account for China’s hegemonic 
ambitions. They further observe that “Driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning 
to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international 
power, China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power in 
Asia” (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, P. 19). Many realists, including Kagan, argue 
that, China, “like all rising powers of the past, including the United States, wants 
to reshape the international system to suit its own purpose” (Kagan, 2005).  
There is, however, a more nuanced version of realism that concludes China’s rise 
does not necessarily pose a threat to regional order (Goldstein, 2005, Glaser, 
1994). Goldstein, for example, evaluates constraints on Chinese foreign 
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policymaking and argues that China’s ‘new grand strategy’ is to balance between 
promoting its continued economic development and its domestic stability. It 
accordingly wishes to modify whatever apprehensions may be held by other 
nations concerning the rise of China (Goldstein, 2005). Other think China’s rise 
needs not be as dangerous as suggested by offensive realists because the 
structural forces which drive great powers into conflicts are often quite weak. 
According to Charles Glaser (Glaser, 1994, Glaser, 2011), the two current 
international conditions that limit the possibility of conflict between China and the 
United States (US) are the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the vast 
expanse of Pacific Ocean. These conditions generate strategic restraint. 
Theoretical Framework  
This study is fundamentally informed by the work of John J. Mearsheimer 
(Mearsheimer, 2002) and other scholars within the offensive realist school of 
international relations. More specifically, this paper supports Mearsheimer’s 
argument that the goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power and 
its ultimate aim is to be the hegemon. This paper utilizes Mearsheimer’s concept 
of “power” as the main analytical framework and applies the notion of 
“distribution of power” in its analysis of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia.  
Before continuing, however, I must make two caveats. First, I do not dismiss 
constructivist theory as an important analytical tool for the study of international 
relations. Constructivism, in fact, offers many useful insights and ideas such as the 
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notions of “distribution of interests” and “change of national identity” which are 
very helpful in understanding the interaction of states in world affairs. However, 
as with any theory, constructivism also has its weakness. One of constructivism’s 
most conspicuous weaknesses is that it tends to over determine “social learning” 
in states’ relations. For that reason, I believe that constructivism proves itself 
unable to adequately explain why China has fundamentally changed its regional 
foreign policy since 2010. Second, because there exists a great diversity of 
analytical approaches within the realist school of international relations, I must 
explain why this study is based on the theoretical work of John J. Mearsheimer. 
One reason that my research follows Mearsheimer’s version of realism is that his 
approach best explains past great power behavior. In fact, Mearsheimer 
successfully tests and demonstrates the empirical validity of his theory by 
examining six cases of great power behavior over two centuries including Japan, 
Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States. Being 
ranked as a new great power, China’s behavior therefore could be best analyzed 
using Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.  
‘Power’ is mainly defined here as having the capacity to compel others to do what 
they otherwise would not do. Although ‘latent power’ which refers to the socio-
economic ingredients that go into building military power is important in defining 
a state’s power, the ultimate determinant of international politics is the level of 
material capabilities one can bring to bear, especially in a military context.    
11 
 
It is also important to define the meaning of ‘hegemony’. A hegemon is a state 
that is able to dominate all the other states in an international system (Gilpin, 
1981, P. 29). No other state has the military capability to contest it successfully on 
its own. There are two types of hegemony in world politics: (1) global hegemons 
which dominate the world; and (2) regional hegemons which dominate distinct 
geographical areas. However, according to John J. Mearsheimer, to become a true 
global hegemon is virtually impossible because no state could project power 
across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. Therefore, the 
only rational choice for a rising great power is to become the regional hegemon or 
the hegemon of other nearby regions (Mearsheimer, 2002, P. 40).  
Although great powers’ goal is to maximize their own power, they cannot always 
act on their offensive intentions because “behavior is not only influenced by what 
states want, but also by their capacity to realize these desires” (Mearsheimer, 
2002, P. 37). ‘Capacity’ here refers to military power of a specific state and how 
this military might compares with other great powers. A great power is likely to 
behave more aggressively when it has a marked power advantage over its rivals. 
On the contrary, it will be very careful and concerned with defending the existing 
balance of power when it is on a disadvantaged position or facing powerful 
opponents. However, it will seize for any opportunities to revise the balance of 
power in its favour with its ultimate aim as a regional hegemon. Simply put, great 
powers are not mindless aggressors, but are calculative power enhancers. 
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Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical framework set out above, this study assumes a causal 
relationship between Chinese military capabilities and its foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia. This study tests the following three hypotheses: (1) China as a 
rising great power will be less inclined to consider offensive action when the 
distribution of power is not advantageous to China, (2) as China’s military 
capabilities grow and the distribution of power changes to its advantage, China 
will behave more aggressively and make every effort to maximize its power to 
become a regional hegemon, and (3) a change in China’s behaviour will cause a 
change in ASEAN perceptions and responses to China’s power.    
I hypothesize that as a rising great power, China will never relinquish its aim to be 
a regional hegemon. Although China’s foreign policy in the SCS disputes may wax 
and wane, its ultimate aim to become a regional hegemon will never change. 
However, as a calculated aggressor, China thinks very carefully about the 
distribution of power between it and other regional states and how these states 
will react to its moves. China weighs the costs and risks of its offensive moves 
against the likely benefits. If the risks outweigh the benefits, it sits tight 
suppressing its aggression and waits for a more propitious moment or a window 
of opportunity.   
This thesis identifies and explains ongoing changes in China’s regional policy. It 
argues that the change of power distribution between China and other states in 
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Southeast Asia is the major driving force that has generated oscillations in 
Beijing’s diplomatic approach to this region since the end of the Cold War.  
Organization of Study  
Chapter Two discusses and critically analyses Beijing’s foreign policy concerning 
SCS disputes from the end of the Cold War until 2009. During this period, Beijing 
successfully built up an image of becoming a ‘good neighbor’ in the region. By 
employing the theory of offensive realism, this chapter argues that the 
disadvantageous distribution of power at China’s expense was the main driver 
behind a more restrained Chinese foreign policy during 1989-2009.  
Chapter Three discusses and critically analyses Beijing’s foreign policy concerning 
SCS disputes since 2010. After nearly two decades of cultivating its image as a 
good neighbour, China substantially changed its foreign policy to become a more 
aggressive posture. Especially, in 2010, China for the first time reportedly claimed 
the SCS as its ‘core interest’ indicating that China is likely to use force in resolving 
the disputes. By employing offensive realism, this chapter argues that there was a 
dramatic growth of Chinese naval power in the SCS during this period and that this 
emerging capability was the main driving force leading China to assure a more 
offensive stance in the SCS.     
Chapter Four offers an evaluation of how Beijing’s recent more aggressive 
behavior in the SCS affected perceptions about China held by Southeast ASEAN 
countries. Chapter Five concludes the study by reviewing and discussing the 
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factors leading to changes in Beijing’s foreign policy regarding the SCS disputes 
since the end of the Cold War. This chapter also considers theoretical and practical 
implications of China’s change of its foreign policy toward SCS disputes since the 
end of the Cold War.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES, 1989-2009: 
PAINTING A PICTURE OF A GOOD NEIGHBOR 
The end of the Cold War marked one of the most important strategic changes in 
world politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world 
left the US as the world’s sole superpower and ushered in an era of unparalleled 
Chinese economic growth. In Southeast Asia, the Russian and US navies that had 
vied for primacy in East and Southeast Asia during the Cold War period either 
withdrew (in the case of Russia) or contracted its previous force presence (in the 
case of the US). These new circumstances required China to fundamentally adjust 
its own regional foreign policy. 
At the same time, China and ASEAN significantly upgraded their relations. Beijing 
was quite successful in building up a good relationship with ASEAN member states 
and China was broadly seen as a good neighbor (Tingchang, 2001, Zhu, 2009, 
Chung, 2009). In 2002, for example, China signed the Declaration of Conduct in 
the South China Sea (DOC - SCS) which was widely considered as an important 
step to the maintaining peace and security in Southeast Asia as well as an 
opportunity for promoting regional development and cooperation. In 2003, China 
signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). In 2005, it acceded to 
conduct joint seismic surveys with Vietnam and the Philippines (Jiping, 2007, P. 
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15). Why did Beijing change its diplomatic approach to adopt a good neighbor 
policy? Was China really intent on becoming a benign rising power?  
Constructivists generally argue that through a prolonged interaction process 
between China and the ASEAN countries, Beijing came to realize that its national 
interests could be better achieved through cooperative rather than competitive 
relations with its neighboring states (Yunling and Shiping, 2005). This realization 
occured through a change in China’s identity and interest formation resulting from 
social interaction with ASEAN member states.  
These arguments, however, need to be reconsidered. Evidence shows that China 
adopted a good neighbor policy during the period of 1989-2009 largely due to 
realist factors rather than because of any change of its identity. It is argued here 
that it was the disadvantageous distribution of power at China’s expanse that was 
the main driver behind Chinese good neighbor policy during the period of 1989-
2009. 
This chapter first briefly describes SCS disputes and China’s relations with ASEAN 
states since the end of the Cold War to 2009. It then discusses the balance of 
power between China and these countries. The chapter next critically analyzes 
three key strategic constraints on Chinese behavior regarding the SCS disputes. 
First of all, although there was an asymmetry of power to the advantage of China 
in the region, China’s power projection capabilities remained very limited thus 
preventing Beijing from enforcing its claims in the SCS disputes. The second 
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constraint relates to US power.  Although the US reduced its naval force presence 
in the SCS following the end of the Cold War, Washington still had important 
national security interests in this area.  As such, China was very unlikely to 
confront the US just for the sake of promoting intensified claims in the SCS. 
China’s economic and military power still lagged far behind that of the US. As 
such, Beijing had little choice but to focus on its own economic development 
instead of being risky to confront the United States in such locales as the SCS. 
Lastly, during 1989-2009, economic development was a top priority for China. In 
order to maintain stable domestic economic development, China had to maintain 
good relations with other states, especially its neighboring ASEAN countries. The 
requirement to pursue stable and cooperative relations with ASEAN states largely 
constrained China from undertaking more assertive position in the SCS. These 
three constraints converged during 1989-2009, thus leading Beijing to suppress 
any aggression and instead employ a good neighbor policy.   
The South China Sea Disputes 
The SCS stretches from the western coast of Singapore in the southeast to Taiwan 
in Northeast Asia, straddling the Vietnamese coast in the west, and the Philippines 
and parts of Malaysia in the east. Scattered throughout the region are 
approximately 160 features including small islands, cays, and drying reefs (Smith, 
2010, P. 215) .  
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In the SCS, the Paracel and Spratly Islands are at the centre of disputes over 
territorial, economic, and strategic interests. The Paracel Islands are claimed by 
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.  
The islands themselves have almost no intrinsic value. It is the maritime resources 
and their geographic position that emanate from these small islands that 
underscore their potential value. In fact, the SCS constitutes a vital section of the 
seaborne trade route linking both Europe and the Middle East to Northeast Asia; 
Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia; and much of Southeast Asia to the Pacific Ocean 
and North America (Noer and Gregory, 1996, P. 63-66). Moreover, the SCS seabed 
potentially offers commercially viable oil and gas deposits as well as highly 
productive fishing grounds. It is the resource potential in the SCS that is the root 
of the current interest in claiming exclusive national jurisdiction over the waters 
and seabed of the SCS (Smith, 2010, P. 217).  
Under the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), whether a country has 
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf from these 
small islands may create great potential value for the claimant. As such, in order 
to enjoy exclusive rights to the continental shelf in this area, the claimants 
acknowledge that it is important to reiterate their sovereign claims to many, or all, 
of these small features that constitute the SCS.  
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China-ASEAN Relations 1989-2009 Regarding the South China Sea Disputes 
In early 1990s, China moved to reassure its neighbours concerning the SCS, but 
also took some actions that caused concern.  In February 1992, China ratified its 
law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Also, in May 1992, Beijing 
signed a contract with Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil and gas in 
disputed waters in this Sea. From mid-1994, China deployed military contingents 
in the  Mischief Reef, which was also claimed by the Philippines (Guan, 2000, P. 
205). This development was remarkable because it was the first time China had 
occupied a reef claimed by an ASEAN state. Concurrent to these aggressive moves, 
Beijing continued to insist on bilateral approach as a means of addressing the 
territorial disputes in the SCS and firmly rejected the multilateral solution initiated 
by ASEAN member states (Hyer, 1995, P. 42). It did so fearing that a multilateral 
negotiation venue would allow ASEAN states to collectively unify and refute 
Chinese positions.  
China’s aggressive behavior during the early 1990s caused widespread concern 
within ASEAN. Although Beijing made some rhetorical concessions, its activities 
continued, prompting accusations that Beijing was pursuing a strategy of “talk and 
take” or “creeping assertiveness” toward the Spratlys (Thayer, 2011a, P. 23). 
China’s actions during this period also made some ASEAN countries, especially the 
Philippines and Indonesia, speculate that it was capitalizing on a perceived power 
vacuum left by the US (Ba, 2003, P. 628). Chinese activities in the South China Sea, 
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according to Alice D. Ba, caused a change in character of ASEAN’s concerns about 
China. He noted, “Where concerns had previously been primarily domestic and 
political, they were now also military and territorial” (Ba, 2003, P. 628) 
However, by 1995, Beijing’s regional diplomatic approach towards ASEAN began 
to change rapidly. In the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, by committing that China 
would not devalue its currency and providing more than US$ 4 billion to stabilise 
the currencies of affected countries, China won praises from ASEAN countries 
(Xizheng, 1999, P. 26). During the second ASEAN+3 meeting in Hanoi in 1998, 
Beijing recommended regular meetings of finance ministers and central bank 
deputies. This new move clearly demonstrates Beijing’s initiative in participating in 
regional affairs. Beijing also showed sympathy for the ASEAN view as intimated in 
the Manila Declaration in July 1992 asserting that territorial disputes should be 
resolved peacefully and cooperatively in the spirit of the TAC (Jones and Smith, 
2007, P. 177-8).  
During the ensuing years, a burgeoning détente in China-ASEAN relations 
occurred. China’s participation in multilateral dialogues with ASEAN countries to 
address the SCS disputes also increased significantly. In November 2002, China 
took an unprecedented approach by signing the DOC-SCS which committed the 
parties to apply self-restraint in resolving the disputes and to build an atmosphere 
of trust and cooperation through dialogue and joint initiatives. Almost 
simultaneously, China concluded a Framework Agreement with ASEAN to establish 
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a Free Trade Area by 2010 (Cheng, 2011, P. 392). In 2003, China further improved 
its relations with ASEAN states by signing to be a ‘strategic partner’ of ASEAN 
(ASEAN, 2003) and by signing ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). By 
signing the TAC, China strengthened its image as a good neighbor which would 
“foster cooperation…[and] refrain from the threat or use of force” (Yunling and 
Shiping, 2005, P. 52).  
By taking a variety of proactive steps, China fundamentally decreased the 
perceptions of a ‘China threat’ held by regional states and, at the same time, 
successfully projected the image of a good neighbor. As stated by Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1999 regarding the Asian Financial Crisis, “China’s 
performance in the Asian financial crisis has been laudable, and the countries in 
this region . . . greatly appreciated China’s decision not to devalue the [yuan]. 
China’s cooperation and high sense of responsibility has spared the region a much 
worse consequence. The price China has to pay to help East Asia is high, and the 
Malaysian people truly appreciate China’s stand” (Xinhua, 1999). 
China – a Rising Great Power 
Coinciding with China’s good neighbor policy was the dramatic rise of its economy. 
In 1995, the World Bank’s standard Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates 
showed that China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased to US$3.8 trillion, 
which was 56% of the US GDP that year (The World Bank, 1997). In 2003, China’s 
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GDP went up to $6.4 trillion, comparable to 58.7% of the US GDP of $10.9 trillion 
and 1.7 times Japan’s GDP of $3.6 trillion (The World Bank, 2003).  
As importantly, Chinese military power during 1989-2009 also developed 
significantly. China engaged in a vast modernization of its armed force and its 
military capability increased substantially. As in the year of 2007, the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army Naval (PLAN) had procured twelve Kilo-class submarines 
and four Sovremennyy-class destroyers from Russia, as well as a navalized version 
of the Russian Su-30 fighter-bomber. China’s defense budget in 2007 was reported 
to reach 350 billion yuan, or US$45 billion - an increase of nearly 18 per cent over 
the year of 2006. The annual procurement budget alone increased from US$3.1 
billion to an estimated US$12.3 billion between 1997 and 2006 (Bitzinger, 2007, P. 
5).   
In short, Chinese military capability increased significantly during this period. 
Although Southeast Asian states also increased fundamentally their military 
power, it is fair to say that, all Southeast countries, even if their intentions were to 
stand up to China, simply did not have the means to do so. Either Vietnam, for 
example, which possessed the largest armed forces in the region, or Singapore, 
which was widely regarded as the most technologically advanced military power in 
Southeast Asia, could not have any chance to mount any sustained military action 
against the current PLA. 
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History shows that rising powers tend to adopt assertive strategies in their 
relations with other states especially with its neighbors (Xuefeng, 2005).  Historical 
experience also teaches us that rising states have fought over territory more than 
any other issue that divides them (Vasquez, 1993).  
As a rising great power both in economic and military terms, why didn’t China act 
aggressively to attain regional hegemony especially through territorial expansion 
instead of employing a good neighbor policy? China did not act aggressively 
because there were three serious constraints on its behavior during the period of 
1989-2009: (1) Geography and the insufficient power projection capabilities of the 
PLA, (2) the US factor, and (3) China’s economic development priority. 
Geography and the Insufficient Power Projection Capabilities of the People’s 
Liberation Army 
Geography is one of the most important difficulties that Beijing must deal with in 
the event of an armed conflict over the disputed SCS islands. Although there was 
an asymmetry of military power between China and other Southeast Asian 
nations, there were several reasons that constrained China from acting 
aggressively in the SCS during this period. First, China’s main naval bases in the 
SCS are Yulin on Hainan Island and Zhanjiang in Guangdong Province. However, 
these bases are much farther from the disputed SCS islands than are the bases of 
its potential Southeast Asian adversaries, leaving its surface forces extremely 
vulnerable in a case of an armed conflict. Therefore, in order to address this 
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problem, the PLA would require effective air cover to prevail in a future regional 
conflict. Given its military capability during the 1900s’, there was little prospect 
that the PLA would overcome this problem effectively because it lacked modern 
aircraft with the range, speed, and maneuverability necessary to protect Chinese 
naval force operating in the area (Gallagher, 1994, P. 178).  
Second, the PLA also suffered from serious disadvantages in its in-flight refueling 
capability. The PLA’s in-flight refueling capability during early 1990s was unable to 
“provide more than a very small force, reduced further by the usual difficulties 
concerning maintenance, to cover Chinese ground and naval forces in the Spratly 
Islands” (Gallagher, 1994, P. 178). This limitation in China’s in-flight refueling 
capability to a large extent decreased the PLA’s military deployment in the SCS. 
Even if the PLA possessed a sizable tanker force, the tanker aircraft would also be 
very vulnerable to attack from long-range aircraft such as MiG-29 and the F-18 
(Gallagher, 1994, P. 178). 
Third, although there was a growing number of Chinese naval surface vessels as 
well as submarines, not many of them were believed to be fit for duty in case of 
an armed conflict in the SCS. During the periods of early 1990s, Chinese ships 
equipped with modern antiaircraft missile systems were virtually nonexistent 
(Moore, 1993, P. 117-127). Although being the world’s second largest submarine 
fleet (after the United States), most of the PLAN’s diesel-powered submarines 
were based on outdated Soviet designs, and only forty-six among one hundred 
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boats were on active duty.  Of the five Chinese-built Han-class nuclear attack 
submarines, only two were believed to fit for duty due to maintenance problems 
(Cheung, 1993, P. 11). In short, in viewing China’s naval military power during this 
period and geographical constraints in the SCS, one could conclude that it was 
very unlikely that China would choose to adopt military means in dealing with the 
SCS disputes.  
International Constraints on China’s Behavior – the US Factor 
 Although the US contracted its naval power in the SCS following the end of the 
Cold War, Washington still had important interests in the area. First, the SCS 
constitutes a vital section of seaborne trade that links Southeast Asia to Northeast 
Asia; both Europe and the Middle East to Northeast Asia; and Southeast Asia to 
the Pacific Ocean and North America (Noer and Gregory, 1996, P. 63-66). In 
particular, the SCS is crucial for the transport of seaborne energy supplies from 
the Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Southeast Asia to the huge resource import-
dependent economies of Northeast Asia – China, Japan and South Korea. Japan 
and South Korea each imports over 80% of their crude oil via the SCS; and, for 
China, which now imports over 50% of its total oil consumption, around 80% to 
90% of those imports cross the South China Sea (Rahman and Tsamenyi, 2010, P. 
317). Additionally, the SCS also constitutes one of the shortest and the most 
essential routes that link the western Pacific with the Indian Ocean for the region’s 
navies (Rahman and Tsamenyi, 2010, P. 138). This area, therefore, is considered as 
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an important operational area and transit route for maritime commercial and 
naval activities.  
The United States was also drawn into the SCS issue because of its wariness of the 
rising China during the period under review. China’s dramatic rise in both 
economic strength and military capability greatly evoked Washington’s vigilance 
of a rising China. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review declared that China was 
one of the United States’ potential global competitors in 21st century (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1997, P. 5). In the 2001 version, the Pentagon stated that 
“maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility exists 
that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the 
region” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001, P. 3-4). The term ‘military competitor’ 
clearly referred to China. In 2006, the Quadrennial Review more explicitly 
observed that, “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest 
potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military 
technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages absent 
US counter strategies” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, P. 29). Therefore, what 
strategic presence the US retained in Southeast Asia served as part of its grand 
strategy to deter against any Chinese expansion of influence in the SCS.  
From the Chinese point of view, the US had a strong interest to contain the 
emergence of any other rising powers including China from challenging its own 
global dominance (Xin, 2000). According to these scholars, the US has made great 
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efforts to apply a policy of containment against China stretching from the Korean 
Peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, into Southeast Asia (Guangyi, 2004). The purpose of 
Washington’s military redeployment and enhancing military ties with some 
Southeast Asian countries was to facilitate its military intervention capabilities in 
case of an armed conflict in Taiwan Strait or in the SCS (Liuning, 2005). In short, 
according to Chinese strategists, the US had three purposes for remaining 
militarily active in the SCS: (1) to contain China, (2) to strike a wedge in China-
ASEAN relations, and (3) to maintain and enhance its own military presence in 
Asia-Pacific (Dangyang, 2002).  
 Perceived American policies of containment against itself compelled China to 
devise a strategy to mitigate Washington’s power. As a rising power, China had 
two policy options to confront the US factor. First, it could mobilize all its 
diplomatic resources to court ASEAN as a way of balancing against the US. Second, 
it could adopt a reassurance policy towards the US and towards its own neighbors 
to prevent and discourage the formation of an anti-China alignment group. Which 
policy China would apply depended fundamentally on the specific issue at hand.  
During the period of 1989 to 2009, China had no choice but to follow the good 
neighbor policy and send clear signals of its willingness to maintain the 
international and regional status quo. Wu Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) specifically identified this Chinese strategy, 
“China’s development will not challenge the existing international order. China 
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has always played a constructive role in international affairs and hopes to 
rationalize the international political and economic order through reforms.” (Wu, 
2007).   
Economic Development Priority and the Role of ASEAN countries 
China thus concluded that the best way to pursue its power was through 
economic development. As China’s Premier Wen Jiabao said, “development will 
remain a top priority for China. To develop ourselves, we need peace, friendship 
and more importantly, cooperation” (Wen, 2007a). As such, a conflict-free 
neighborhood was inarguably an essential precondition for China to concentrate 
on domestic economic development.  
A stable and cooperative relation between China and ASEAN nations was of 
primary importance to China’s development strategy. Economically, Southeast 
Asian countries were among the most important factors that constituted the 
success of Chinese economic development between 1989-2009. China’s trade 
with ASEAN nations has undergone rapid growth thanks to the ASEAN–China Free 
Trade Area (ACFTA) agreement signed in November 2002. For example, China-
ASEAN merchandise trade had increased significantly from $US 6bn in 1991 to $US 
202.5bn in 2007 (Dumbaugh, 2008, P. 91-97). By the end of June 2006, ASEAN had 
made a total net investment of $US 40bn in China. In the other direction, there 
was also a strong growth of China’s investment in ASEAN (Tongzon, 2005). ASEAN 
during this period was a major market for China’s project contractors and labor 
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service (Wen, 2006). Realizing the importance of ASEAN to its economic 
development, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao observed that, “China cannot develop 
itself in isolation from the rest of the world, and particularly East Asia” and that, 
“China’s future is inextricably linked to that of other East Asian countries. Stability 
and prosperity in East Asia provide an important guarantee for China’s 
development” (Wen, 2007b).  
In summary, although there were several reasons that led Beijing to follow good 
neighbor policy in Southeast Asian region during the period of 1989-2009, the 
main driving forces were its lack of adequate power projection capabilities in the 
SCS, the US factor, and the importance of ASEAN nations in China’s economic 
development strategy. For those reasons, China realized that it would be a wise 
choice to adopt a good neighbor policy to further develop its own economy. 
Conclusion 
The end of the Cold War marked a crucial change in China’s foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia. The collapse of the bipolar required China to fundamentally adjust 
its regional policy. There was a growing concern within ASEAN and the US that 
China would become more aggressive and resort to coercive action in resolving 
territorial disputes not only because of the removal of constraints on Chinese 
foreign policy made by the collapse of the bipolar world but also because of 
China’s dramatic growth of economic and military power following the end of the 
Cold War. However, contrary to expectations, China during this period behaved as 
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a peaceful rising power. In fact, China was widely regarded as a good neighbor and 
its diplomatic approach was generally termed as a ‘good neighbor policy’. 
Constructivists therefore argued that China changed its identity to become a 
benign rising power through the process of interaction with other states.  
This argument is unwarranted. Evidence shows that China did not act aggressively 
during this period because there were three strategic constraints on its behavior: 
the lack of adequate military ability to operate in the SCS; the continuous military 
role of the United States; and lastly, the importance of ASEAN nations to China’s 
economic development strategy. These factors converged during the period of 
1989-2009 and thus led Beijing to recognize that the only best strategy to 
maximize its power was through economic development. This situation required 
the close cooperation between China and its neighboring states. Therefore, during 
this period, China decided to put aside territorial disputes and followed a good 
neighbor policy. In short, it was the need to fulfill national interests that shaped 
China’s behavior during this period rather than any concrete change in China’s 
identity.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 2009-2011: 
A THREAT LOOMS LARGE 
As noted in previous chapter, China’s good neighbor policy toward Southeast 
Asian countries during the period of 1989 to 2009 was largely driven by realist 
calculations. In other words, it was the disadvantageous distribution of power 
from China’s perspective that prevented it from acting more aggressively. What is 
at question here is whether China changed its behavior in the SCS disputes after 
that power balance began to shift perceptibly.   
The answer is clear. In 2010 China turned out to be far more assertive in its claims 
toward the SCS than ever before. China reportedly for the first time claimed the 
SCS to be its “core interest” (Wong, 2010, Yoshihara and Holmes, 2011) on par 
with Taiwan and Tibet, implying that China would possibly employ force in 
resolving the disputes. This claim was followed by an escalation in Chinese 
aggressive behavior in the SCS disputes.  
In 2010, China conducted four high profile naval exercises to showcase the 
growing prowess of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). These naval 
exercises employed different types of modern warships and submarines such as 
Sovremenny-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, and other modern weapons 
(Thayer, 2010, P. 6-8). These naval exercises were a demonstration by Beijing that 
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it now had the capability “to sustain larger naval deployments in the Spratly 
archipelago”  (Thayer, 2010, P. 8).  
China became even more assertive in the first half of 2011. In March, it warned 
against any oil exploration in waters it claimed in the SCS (Calica, 2011). In May, it 
declared it would step up maritime patrols by at least 10 percent to protect its 
territorial waters (United Press International, 2011). On August  10, China’s first 
aircraft carrier began its first sea trials (Wines, 2011). The current situation poses 
serious questions: what has made China become so aggressive? Does the changing 
distribution of regional power favoring Beijing prompt it to act more forcefully? 
Beijing usually reassures others that China will rise peacefully and it would never 
act as a hegemon. However, public rhetoric is often an unreliable indicator of 
actual foreign policy intentions. China is no exception. In order to determine 
whether Beijing is seeking to maximize its power, one tangible way is to review its 
military capabilities. Put simply, if China’s forces are largely ‘defensive’ in nature, 
then its intentions are probably less threatening to other parties. If they are 
offensive, then China’s intentions are probably not defensive. For that reason, 
assessing existing and nascent Beijing’s military capability will help determine the 
nature of Beijing’s objectives concerning the SCS disputes.    
This chapter therefore reviews China’s changing military capabilities and especially 
its power projection capabilities into the SCS. The paper argues that there has 
been a dramatic growth of Chinese naval power in the SCS over the past two to 
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three years, and that this capability reflects China’s greater determination to act 
aggressively in the SCS.   
The chapter focuses extensively on China’s most controversial recent military 
development – its aircraft carrier program. Because aircraft carriers are primary 
instruments of military power, this program could signal China’s intention to 
project its military power further away from its border. The US is always a decisive 
factor shaping China’s regional security approach. How might China endeavor to 
resolve the US factor should Washington decide to intervene more decisively in 
SCS disputes? The next section is intended to answer this question. Finally, it 
concludes that China became more assertive in its claims in the South China Sea 
disputes during the period of 2010-2011 because of an immense growth of 
Chinese power projection capabilities in this area. 
China's Changing Material Power in the South China Sea   
China has a far larger military force than the other claimants in the SCS. What is 
significant during the period of 2010-2011 is that China has become visibly more 
powerful than it was previously and its power projection capabilities in the SCS 
have dramatically improved.  
Currently, the PLAN possesses around 10 nuclear-powered submarines and 60 
diesel-electric submarines. The second-generation Type 093/Shang Class nuclear-
powered attack submarine and Type 094/Jin Class nuclear-powered missile 
submarine have also come into service. Older Type 033/Romeo Class and Type 
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035/Ming Class diesel-electric submarines are being gradually supplanted by the 
newer indigenous Type 039/Song class and Russian-built Kilo Class (SinoDefence, 
2011b). This force modernization program reflects the development of quieter 
and more modern Chinese submarines that are less detectable and more lethal, 
especially in terms of firing anti-ship cruise missiles.     
China has also achieved progress in developing both its military strike and anti-
access capabilities. Especially, since 1994, the PLA has added a conventional force 
component to its existing offensive missile force structure with an inventory of 
more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles and an emerging class of theater 
ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles (Christman, 2011, P. 198). Beijing is 
reportedly upgrading the quality of these short-range missiles systems to increase 
their range, lethality, accuracy, and reliability - including methods to counter 
ballistic missile defenses. For example, China’s original CSS-7 missile reportedly 
has an extended range of 500-700 km, an accuracy of 500-600 meters, and 
specialized fuel-air explosive and submunitions warheads (SinoDefence, 2011a). In 
short, China’s strike and anti-access capabilities now have widespread coverage 
enveloping most of the SCS area. From the China’s mainland, the entire SCS now 
falls within range of Chinese conventional missiles.  
In addition, China has extended its capabilities on the islands and reefs it occupies 
in the South China Sea. These reefs and islands reportedly have been extensively 
fortified with anti-aircraft and naval guns as well as landing pads for helicopters. 
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Other fortifications include the installation of one J-17C radar which provides the 
country with earlywarning capability, the installations of anti-ship cruise missile on 
Woody Island, and many others (Emmers, 2010, P. 122) 
China is also well equipped for surveillance of the entire region thanks to the 
establishment of two major naval air bases on Hainan Island, a smaller outpost on 
Woody Island and a military presence on other islands in the Paracel Group 
(Elleman, 2009, P. 46-48). The Yulin naval base in Hainan Island has undergone 
major expansion since the late 1990s. This complex includes two piers of about 
one kilometer in length which is capable of hosting very large ships (including, if 
need be, future Chinese aircraft carriers). Beijing is also constructing a nuclear 
submarine base in  Hainan Island which is capable of housing up to 20 nuclear-
powered submarines (Rahman and Tsamenyi, 2010, P. 323). These developments 
further increase China’s strategic presence and power projection capabilities in 
the SCS. 
In short, the PLA Navy has been strengthened in Southeast Asia to an extent that 
no other claimants can compete against it. While China could not project force 
decisively into the Spratly islands during the period after the end of the Cold War 
due to its lack of sufficient and modern weapons, that mission is now within its 
capabilities. Because this major constraint has been removed, Beijing has become 
increasingly confident of its military capabilities. This confidence leads Beijing to 
act more aggressively in the SCS.             
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However, to some analysts, the above evidence is insufficient to claim that China 
is seeking hegemony. In fact, they argue that even though China has built a large 
navy, if its intention remains defensive, its behavior will be peaceful (Nakai, 2011, 
P. 7). These observers further argue that China’s intention is largely defensive 
because the intentions that underlie Beijing’s current naval strategy are mainly 
driven by economic concerns. Its intention is “not to build a global offensive navy, 
but to build a local war-oriented regional navy” (Nakai, 2011, P. 7). 
Such arguments, however, are unwarranted for two reasons. First, although 
China’s current naval strategy seems to be defensive in nature, the borderline 
between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ is rather thin. China’s naval strategy could still 
be defensive today but it could also turn into offensive strategy very quickly. As 
noted by John J. Mearsheimer, strategic intentions are very difficult to ascertain, 
and, if known, there is no guarantee that they will remain constant (Mearsheimer, 
2002, P. 31). For many states, a defensive strategy is a first step towards 
hegemony. Second, China is pursuing a calculated strategy of national interest. It 
can wait for more favorable circumstances if it deems it is currently in a 
disadvantaged position. In other words, because its top priority is to develop its 
economy, China must now propitiate its neighbors’ fears of any ‘China threat’. Yet, 
Beijing could change this strategy abruptly if it judges that the gains in doing so 
outweigh the risks. How could one assess whether China’s strategy is truly 
offensive or defensive? Looking closer at Beijing’s aircraft carrier program could 
give us an adequate answer. 
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China’s Aircraft Carrier Program 
Although China has made great progress in improving power projection 
capabilities in the SCS (as discussed above), it is fair to say that it still possesses 
little in the way of offshore force-projection capabilities. In order to effectively 
further its national interests in the SCS and to engage in the full spectrum of 
traditional operations, a better strategy for the PLAN is to possess one of the 
strongest force projection instruments – aircraft carriers. As noted by Admiral Liu 
Huaqing, “Aircraft carriers symbolize a country’s overall strength. They are also 
the core of the navy’s combined-arms sea operations … Building carriers has all 
along been a matter of concern for the Chinese people. To modernize our national 
defense and build a perfect weaponry and equipment system, we have to 
consider the development of carriers.” (Liu, 2004, P. 481). 
There are two main reasons to conclude that China’s aircraft carrier program is a 
reflection of its offensive intentions: (1) the inherently offensive nature of an 
aircraft carrier; and (2) the PLAN’s thinking about aircraft carriers’ employment. 
First, no one would deny that aircraft carriers are instruments of power 
projection. Indeed, the primary role of an aircraft carrier is to facilitate air 
operations away from the mainland. By deploying aircraft carriers, the PLAN could 
facilitate Chinese air operations in the SCS by obviating the need for short-range 
fighters to sortie from land bases. This strategy, according to Liu Huaqing, would 
maximize the utility of China’s regional air power (Liu, 2004, P. 480).  
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Some policy-makers and analysts, however, contest the centrality of China’s 
aircraft carrier strategy by arguing that its initial aircraft carrier is nothing more 
than a nationalistic showpiece rather than having true operational value. They 
point out that the combat capability of Chinese current aircraft carrier – the 
Varyag, which employs a short takeoff but arrested recovery (STOBAR) design (a 
ski-jump design), is less appropriate for the strike role and is far less capable than 
U.S. Navy–style catapultassisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) aircrafts 
(Kostecka, 2011, P. 17-18). However, this argument needs to be reconsidered 
because recent studies show that China’s aircraft carrier capabilities and 
ambitions may be larger than the current literature has predicted. According to 
Nan Li and Christopher Weuve (Li and Weuve, 2010), major changes in leadership 
endorsement, financial affordability, naval strategy, and availability of requisite 
technologies have created sufficient conditions for China to acquire aircraft 
carriers. 
Beijing, however, has asserted that, “Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, 
unlike another country, we will not use it to pursue global deployment or global 
reach” (Dickie and Dickson, 2008). As intimated earlier, Beijing’s rhetorical 
statements are simply unreliable indicators of its foreign policy intentions. For that 
reason, in order to check whether Beijing will employ aircraft carriers as a mean to 
maximize its power in the SCS, the best approach is to study the PLA’s rationales 
for its aircraft carrier employment.  
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Recent events in the SCS coupled with authoritative PLA publications affirm that 
Beijing is very likely to employ aircraft carriers to increase its power projection in 
these waters. Although China’s military modernization is primarily geared to 
prevent Taiwan’s declaration of independence, the employment of aircraft 
carriers in the SCS is also a plausible scenario. In fact, the only offshore combat 
that the PLAN has actually undertaken is in the SCS. This includes the Paracel 
incident in January 1974 against South Vietnam, the violent Spratlys clash in 
March 1988 with Vietnamese naval forces, and the Mischief Reef incident with the 
Philippines in 1995 (Guan, 2000). In 2009, in response to Vietnam’s and Malaysia’s 
submissions to extend their continental shelves into the SCS, Beijing ‘clarified’ its 
claim to the SCS through a Note Verbale stating that China “has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and the adjacent waters” (Beckman, 2010, 
P. 2). It simultaneously submitted a map of China’s claim which embraces almost 
all of the South China Sea (Emmers, 2010, P. 129). Recently, China has elevated 
the strategic importance of the SCS by claiming that this waterway is one of its 
‘core interests’, inferring that China is likely to use force to resolve the disputes.  
How to defend a ‘core interest’ in the SCS, however, is a real challenge to the PLA 
(Yoshihara and Holmes, 2011). It requires the PLA to be able to project force and 
simultaneously employ sea-based airpower against islands and reefs occupied by 
Beijing’s rival claimants. As such, providing air cover is inarguably the most 
important mission for the PLAN. Although China’s growing naval capability is 
uncontested, air cover is only ensured with the support of aircraft carriers.  
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All these trends seem to be in line with recent authoritative PLA publications. The 
book ‘Science of Campaign’ (Yulang, 2006) mentions the tactic of ‘three-
dimensional attacks’ as a way to execute the PLA’s ‘coral-island-assault campaign’ 
in the SCS. This book also discusses extensively the role of an aircraft carrier in a 
possible confrontation at sea, arguing that such a platform would be tailor-made 
for this purpose. It claims that even one or two carriers would be enough for the 
PLA to prevail against such combatants as Vietnam or the Philippines.  
Taking a different approach, ‘Campaign Theory Study Guide’ (Xingye, 2002) 
assesses the Chinese employment of aircraft carriers in a campaign to protect 
critical sea lines of communications (SLOCs) - namely a ‘sea-traffic-protection 
campaign’. This book describes a variety of missions to be executed to protect 
SLOCs in the SCS such as air defense, antisubmarine, and others. All these missions 
are definitely within an aircraft carrier’s capability to fulfill. 
The book ‘Winning High-Tech Local Wars: Must Reading for Military Officers’ 
(Qiming and Feng, 1998) infers that China’s future carriers would be mainly used 
in the SCS. It is claimed that Chinese amphibious forces which engaged in remote 
landing operations should be protected by at least one aircraft carrier group 
stationed 100 to 150 nautical miles from the shore of the objective. These words, 
according to Kostecka, apparently refer to non-Taiwan landing operations because 
Taiwan Strait is only more than 100 nautical miles wide (Kostecka, 2011, P. 15). 
The area which these analysts cite is obviously the SCS. 
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In short, China’s employment of aircraft carriers coupled with recent Chinese 
discussions about military strategy point to that country seeking to maximize 
power in the SCS. Although the employment of aircraft carriers is applicable to a 
wider set of scenarios, it is the SCS where aircraft carriers are currently most 
applicable. As stated by one Chinese military expert, “Our carrier will definitely 
not engage with powerful US aircraft carrier fighting groups. But it is enough to be 
a symbolic threat among neighboring countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines who have territorial disputes with China”(Chan, 2010).  
It is clear that China has improved its capabilities to project power into the SCS, 
leading Beijing to be more confident about its claims in SCS territorial disputes. By 
looking at recent events as well as PLA theory about aircraft carrier employment, 
it is reasonable to conclude that China’s strategic intention regarding the SCS is 
increasingly offensive. As noted in previous chapters, however, the US remains a 
decisive factor in shaping Southeast Asia’s regional geopolitics. Whether China 
succeeds in maximizing power in the SCS mostly depends on reactions of the US. 
Should America abstain from involvement in SCS disputes, this would relax the 
pressure on Chinese naval forces substantially. Because of the complexity and 
geographic strategic feature of this area, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which the US would intervene in future SCS disputes. Given a worst-case scenario 
where a full-scale war was to break out in the SCS and the US responded with a 
full-scale intervention, it is doubtful that China could defend its ‘core interest’ of 
SCS control against the world’s strongest and most technologically advanced 
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military. What strategy China uses to safeguard its own interests against the US in 
maritime Southeast Asia is therefore the lynchpin in China’s foreign policy in the 
SCS. Answering this question will give us better insights into China’s recent 
behavior in that locale.  
Beijing and the US Factor 
Although being the strongest military actor in the region, Beijing recognizes its 
military vulnerabilities vis-a-vis US military power. It would have little chance to 
prevail against the United States in a whole scale maritime conflict. As such, to 
defend its ‘core interest’ in the SCS, Beijing would need to construct the capability 
to fight and win a regional war against the world’s remaining super power.  
Some analysts claim that China is pursuing a strategy mainly aiming at slowing 
down, disrupting, and complicating the deployment of American force assets in 
relevant theaters of operation rather than directly confronting US forces. China is 
doing so by investing in naval mines, cruise missile technologies, electronic 
warfare capabilities and related technologies. Observers label this approach as an 
‘‘access-denial’ strategy and claim that this posture is defensive in nature 
(O’Rourke, 2006, P. 35-36). 
This point of view, however, needs careful considerations. Evidence shows that 
Beijing’s strategy of such called ‘access-denial’ is actually much more ambitious 
and thus has more significant implications than one might initially surmise. China’s 
‘access-denial’ strategy is not simply aimed at disrupting or delaying the arrival of 
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US intervention forces but is designed to totally destroy US forces through a 
concerted campaign. It is this type of capabilities development strategy that builds 
up Beijing’s confidence and underpins its recent aggressive behavior in the South 
China Sea.  
China’s Missile Capabilities and their Implications for the United States 
Since Beijing’s first use of missiles in the Taiwan crisis in March 1996 (Ross, 1996), 
its conventional missiles have substantially transformed from militarily inferior 
weapons relative to their US counterparts to highly accurate and lethal modes of 
precise firepower. Chinese missiles have not only become more powerful but 
constitute a substantial psychological factor that helps Beijing to shift Southeast 
Asia’s strategic force balance in its favour. 
The sheer number of China’s missiles has grown significantly. In 2011, China was 
reported to possess approximately 110 to 140 nuclear-armed strategic missiles, 
including 15 to 20 DongFeng 3 (CSS-2) Intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBMs), 15 to 20 DongFeng 4 (CSS-3) IRBMs, 20 DongFeng 5 (CSS-4) 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 60 to 80 DongFeng 21 (CSS-5) 
medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Also, China’s Strategic Missile Force was 
equipped with 900 to 1,000 conventional theatre missiles, including the DongFeng 
15 (CSS-6) and DongFeng 11 (CSS-7) Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) 
(SinoDefence, 2011b). Many of these are deployed in or near the East China Sea 
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opposite Taiwan. However, they could also be activated for future defense 
operations in the SCS. 
There has also been substantial improvement in the lethality of these missiles. For 
example, the Chinese Second Artillery’s DF-21 MRBM now can reach an estimated 
maximum range of 2,150 km (Lennox, 2010). China has also begun the 
procurement of the much more potent DF-21A and DF-21B missile series which 
could reach an extended range of 2,500 km. These missiles use in-flight Global 
Positioning System (GPS) updates and a radar-correlation terminal-guidance 
systems which would allow the DF-21A and the DF-21B to achieve a highly 
accurate circulate error probability (CEP) of fifty and ten meters respectively 
(Lennox, 2010). With such devastating capabilities, these missiles could now be 
tasked with conducting a variety of missions including attacking airfields, ports, 
logistic networks and especially moving ships (Mulvenon and Yang, 2002, P. 34-
35).  
What are the implications of this substantial development of China’s missiles for 
US military power in the region? It should be noted here that the use of aircraft 
carrier groups is a possible option for the US should it decide to intervene into the 
SCS disputes. As such, the most important mission that Beijing is facing is how to 
engage successfully US aircraft carrier groups in a regional war. According to the 
Congressional Research Service, there are several types of Chinese weapons that 
could neutralise US surface assets including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, 
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submarines, naval mines, maritime attack aircraft, and surface combatants 
(O’Rourke, 2006, P. 37). However, in terms of the current distribution of military 
power between China and the US, the former’s employment of missile systems is 
inarguably the best combat option for China to pursue. Other Chinese weapons 
can also be employed certainly but they must largely rely on antiship cruise 
missiles (ASCMs) to engage US force successfully. 
With this factor in mind, Beijing has put great effort into building up and 
developing ASCMs. In fact, Beijing has procured a large number of ASCMs 
specifically designed to destroy US surface assets. These missiles are equipped 
with inertial guidance, terminal radar guidance, and in-flight GPS updates which 
allow these missiles to attack targets with high precision. Notably, the SS-N-22 
Sunburn equipped on the Sovremenny-class destroyer and the SS-N-27 Sizzler on 
the Kilo-class submarine reportedly travel at supersonic speed and drop just ten 
meters above the surface in the attack stage, maneuvering to evade defenses and 
attack at unexpected angles. Even more surprisingly, most of China’s ASCMs are 
reported to be capable of attacking in the range between 160 and 400 km, 
exceeding the range of the principal ASCM used by the United States (the RGM-84 
Harpoon), by factors as large as 3.25 (Lennox, 2010). With such devastating 
capabilities, these Chinese missiles have been equipped in nearly every ship and 
aircraft in the PLAN (Lennox, 2010).  
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In order to improve its capability for engaging moving US carrier groups, China has 
also developed the well-known DF-21C ground-based antiship ballistic missiles 
(ASBM), equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV). The most striking 
feature of this missile is that, when fired at a target, it would deliver its MaRV to 
the general vicinity of a US carrier group, at which point a terminal-guidance suite 
would seek out and destroy this target. The Chinese ASBM is specifically designed 
to guarantee penetration of antimissile defenses (Hoyler, 2010). Thanks to this 
significant feature, China’s ASBMs are widely regarded as being highly capable of 
striking at moving targets at sea hundreds of miles away. According to Admiral 
Robert Willard, commander of the US Pacific Command, an ASBM prototype has 
met ‘initial operating capability’ with an estimated maximum range of 2.500 km 
(Gertz, 2010). This new capability not only lets ASBMs to engage the US carrier 
groups credibly but also successfully reaches the entire SCS as well as the western 
approaches to the Strait of Malacca.  
Regarding China’s recent substantial growth in missile numbers as well as the 
dramatic improvement in lethality of these weapons, it is unwarranted to claim 
that Beijing is seeking merely to ‘slow down’ and disrupt the US force. Conversely, 
China’s recent build-up of its missiles proves that it is committed to securing the 
capability to win any future regional-scale conflict against the US Navy.  
The argument that China is building up its missile force to largely destroy US navy 
is also strongly supported by PLA doctrinal writings. There are few PLA doctrinal 
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writings suggesting that China is following a strategy to delay and disrupt the US 
force. Indeed, no equivalent term to ‘access denial’ appears anywhere in China’s 
military writings (Cliff et al., 2007, P. 17). On the contrary, Chinese doctrinal 
writings mostly focus on the need to completely defeat the enemy as quickly as 
possible. For example, the book ‘the Science of Campaigns’ states that missiles 
operations would be carried out to “produce the strategic and campaign 
superiority, creating conditions for winning the decisive battle” (Wang and Zhang, 
2000, Chapter 6, P. 3). More importantly, such publications as ‘the Science of 
Military Campaigns’, the ‘Science of Second Artillery Campaigns’, and even China’s 
latest Defense White Paper also support this line of argument. Beijing’s most 
authoritative military writings thus focus mainly on applying firepower efficiently 
to win a decisive victory over Beijing’s enemy force in a conventional military 
campaign (Wang and Zhang, 2008, Chap. 6, P. 3).  
In summary, there are several reasons leading to the conclusion that Beijing has 
become dangerously aggressive in its claims in the SCS disputes since 2010. 
However, the most important factor leading to China’s change of foreign policy 
during this period is the immense growth of its military capabilities and especially 
its power projection capabilities in the SCS. China’s development of an aircraft 
carrier and its strategic missile force development are inarguably the two most 
convincing pieces of evidence in this context.  
 
49 
 
Conclusion 
At the end of the Cold War, China elected to follow a diplomatic approach 
described as a “good neighbor policy” in the SCS. However, China’s behavior has 
substantially changed over the past two years. It has for the first time claimed the 
SCS to be a ‘core interest’ on par with Taiwan and Tibet. This claim is consistent 
such as China’s unilateral fishing ban in the SCS from May 16 to August 1, 2011, 
the two cable-cutting incidents occurring between Vietnam and China in May and 
June 2011, and the first ever sea trials of China’s aircraft carrier - Varyag in August 
2011. All these recent developments pose serious questions: what are the causes 
of Beijing’s change of its diplomatic approach? Does the distribution of military 
power in the South China Sea explain Beijing’s stronger posture there? It has been 
argued here that China’s growing military capabilities and especially its power 
projection capabilities have made Beijing more confident and increasingly 
aggressive in its claims in the SCS. Indeed, current China’s power projection 
capabilities in the SCS including the employment of new classes of surface ships 
and submarines, its great progress in strike and anti-access capabilities, the 
expansion of Yulin naval base and the construction of a nuclear submarine base in 
Hainan Island, and other developments have removed the constraints of 
geography previously impeded PLA operations.  
The United States is always a decisive factor shaping China’s regional diplomatic 
approach and thereby regional order. The startling growth in numbers as well as 
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the growing lethality of China’s missiles has put US carrier battle groups and 
related forces in greater danger. This trend is also in line with PLA current military 
doctrine of missile employment. China’s dramatic development of its projection 
capabilities especially the employment of aircraft carriers as well as the missiles 
strategic force suggest that China is seeking to maximize its regional military 
powers and to pursue a strategy of regional hegemony. How this trend affects 
Southeast Asian perceptions of China’s role in the SCS will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S AGGRESSIVE MOVES ON THE PERCEPTIONS AND 
BEHAVIOR OF ASIAN TOWARDS CHINA, 2009-2011 
Previous chapters argued that it is realist motives that are the main driving forces 
behind China’s policy toward the SCS. This chapter assesses the effects of Beijing’s 
recent behavior on the threat perceptions of ASEAN countries and their recent 
security behavior toward China regarding the SCS disputes.  
Beijing’s recent aggressive moves have imparted a negative impact on China-
ASEAN relations in the SCS. Over the past two years, the ASEAN states have 
returned to their previous view of China as a rising threat. Empirical support for 
this argument is offered here through an analysis of China’s changing national 
image in ASEAN’s perceptions regarding the SCS disputes, from one of “partner” 
to one of “rising threat”.  
Data for this analysis is extracted from two sources: (1) analysis of ASEAN’s 
diplomacy toward China and (2) regional states’ security behavior toward SCS 
disputes. Emphasis is directed mostly toward the diplomatic approaches and 
security behavior of Vietnam – the ASEAN member who has the most overlapping 
SCS claims with China.  
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Diplomatic Approaches and Security Behavior toward China 
It is not surprising that China’s recently offensive behavior toward the SCS has 
triggered substantially vigorous diplomatic and military reactions from ASEAN’s 
member states. Prospects for China and ASEAN agreeing on confidence building 
measures as indicated in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS 
(DOC-SCS) as well as in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
(TAC) have largely dissipated as a result of China’s recent aggressive assertion of 
sovereignty claims in the SCS, especially those incidents involving Vietnam. While 
Vietnam was previously regarded as a political partner with the PRC for 
developing the offshore oil potential in the Spratlys in 2005, this country now 
becomes one of the “frontline” states in ASEAN’s territorial disputes with China. If 
this analysis is correct, then evidence of increased tension in Sino-ASEAN relations 
should become increasingly manifest in diplomatic approach and security behavior 
of Vietnam towards China. If perceptions of a ‘China threat’ intensify throughout 
the region, the diplomatic approach and security behavior of Vietnam should 
reflect such a condition.  
Vietnam 
Of all the ASEAN member states, Vietnam has the most strained relationship with 
China. These two countries share a border that has led to centuries of invasions 
and armed conflicts. As Beijing has stepped up its claims in the SCS and has 
imposed unilateral fishing bans in these waters, bilateral relations have 
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deteriorated. They have also been exacerbated by two cable cutting incidents in 
Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on May 26 and June 9 2011 respectively. 
These Chinese actions have triggered strong reactions from Hanoi, indicating 
unprecedented increased tension in Sino-Vietnam relations.  
Just after the second cable cutting incident on June 9 2011, Vietnamese President 
Nguyen Minh Triet made an unusually strong statement in defense of Vietnam’s 
national sovereignty declaring that, “we are ready to sacrifice everything to 
protect our homeland our sea and island sovereignty” (Vnexpress, 2011). Live-fire 
exercises on June 13th conducted by Hanoi further underscored their 
determination.  
China labeled Vietnam’s live-fire exercises as the “lowest form of nationalism to 
create a new enmity between the people of the two countries. Hanoi seems to be 
looking to dissipate domestic pressure and buck up morale at home, while at the 
same time further drawing in the concern of international society over the SCS 
dispute” (Associated Press, 2011). Chinese statements later reported in the 
international media emphasized that China has “never sought to politically 
blackmail smaller countries. But when a small country turns that around and tries 
to blackmail China, the Chinese people will on the one hand feel rather angry, 
while on the other hand find it quite amusing”. Chinese spokespersons concluded 
their assessment by warning that, “If Vietnam insists on making trouble, thinking 
that the more trouble it makes, the more benefits it gains, then we truly wish to 
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remind those in Vietnam who determine policy to please read your history” 
(Associated Press, 2011).  
In addition to projecting the tough diplomatic line cited above, Hanoi has also 
significantly enhanced its military capabilities to deter Beijing from using force in 
contested areas. It has concluded a major arms deal with Russia involving the 
purchase of six Kilo-class submarines valued at about two billion US dollars. 
According to analysts, this purchase aims to support Vietnam’s claims against 
China over potentially resource-rich islands in the SCS (Bangkok Post, 2009). 
Vietnam’s other significant forces modernization includes the purchase of Sukhoi 
Su-30MKK fighters and DHC-6 Series 400 amphibious aircraft for maritime patrol, 
an extra short-range ballistic missile from Israel, a second Gepard-class warship 
from Russia, and three sophisticated Vera passive radiolocators from the Czech 
Republic. Talks are also under way, aimed at acquiring 12 Let L-410 short-range 
transport aircraft from the Czech Republic (Robert Karniol, 2011).  
Furthermore, Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay has also opened up to foreign navy vessels 
after eight years of closure. This new move could be regarded as a part of a 
Vietnamese strategy to counteract Beijing’s assertiveness in the SCS. This step is 
important because having employed this port - one of the best deepwater shelters 
in Southeast Asia, states will enjoy a strategic geographic presence in the SCS as it 
is located near key shipping lanes in the SCS. The Cam Ranh Bay could also be 
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effectively employed to repair ships, fuel aircraft carriers, and conduct other 
important military activities (Chen, 2011).       
Hanoi has also returned to an age-old tradition of relying on larger, external 
powers to help balance against Beijing. While during the Cold War, Hanoi 
cultivated ties with Moscow to balance Beijing, it has now developed security ties 
with Washington mainly to balance against China. Vietnam has joined the annual 
multilateral Cobra Gold military exercises conducted in Thailand which involve the 
US, a number of ASEAN states and other parties. It has also begun sending military 
officers to the United States for training (Goh, 2008, P. 269-270). The visit of the 
USS George Washington to Vietnam in August 2010 is convincing evidence of 
blossoming military relations between Vietnam and the US. This visit entailed 
discussions between US and Vietnamese officials on a wide range of topics ranging 
from negotiating a controversial deal to share civilian nuclear fuel and technology 
to agreeing that China needs to work with its neighbors to resolve territorial 
claims in the SCS. According to Carlyle A. Thayer, “Quite simply, these are not too 
subtle signals that Vietnam wants the United States to stay engaged in the region 
to balance China” (The Telegraph, 2010). 
In September 2011, Hanoi’s defense diplomacy was reported to have produced a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation with the United 
States. This MOU, according to Vietnamese Lieutenant-General Nguyen Chi Vinh, 
“provides a framework for bilateral cooperation in overcoming the war 
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consequences, conducting research and training activities, ensuring maritime 
security, exchanging experiences and information as well as maintaining peace in 
the region” (Robert Karniol, 2011). Also, Vietnam's Foreign Ministry and the US 
State Department have conducted their fourth bilateral Political, Security and 
Defence Dialogue which includes talks on potential US Naval access to Cam Ranh 
Bay (Robert Karniol, 2011). 
Beside the US, Hanoi has also extensively cultivated relations with New Delhi to 
balance against China. India reportedly was invited by Vietnam to establish a 
“sustainable maritime presence” in the South China Sea. In June 2011, Hanoi 
allowed Indian naval warships to drop anchor at its Nha Trang port in southern 
Vietnam (Pakistan Defense, 2011). This move obviously enabled New Delhi to play 
a bigger role in the strategic Southeast Asian region overlooking key shipping lanes 
in the SCS. In return, India offered naval facilities for training and capacity-building 
to Vietnam.   
Recently, on October 12, 2011, India bolstered its presence in the SCS when its 
state-run explorer Oil and Natural Gas Corp signed a three-year deal with 
PetroVietnam for developing long-term cooperation in the oil sector (Reuters, 
2011c). This new move triggered serious warnings from Beijing. The China Energy 
News, published by Communist Party mouthpiece the People's Daily, said that this 
cooperation project was a ‘bad idea’. It noted, “India's energy strategy is slipping 
into an extremely dangerous whirlpool … [this move] will most likely seriously 
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harm India's whole energy security and interrupt its economic development” and 
warned that “Indian oil company policy makers should consider the interests of 
their own country, and turn around at the soonest opportunity and leave the 
South China Sea” (Reuters, 2011c).    
In short, Chinese recent aggressive behavior has inevitably deteriorated relations 
between Beijing and Hanoi. In Hanoi’s view, China is a looming threat. In Beijing’s 
view, Vietnam has been the most conspicuous example among ASEAN members in 
pursuing a hedging strategy against China by strengthening its security ties with 
other powers and by bolstering its own military capabilities (Cheng, 2011, P. 387). 
Other ASEAN States 
Like Vietnam, relations between the Philippines and China have deteriorated 
rapidly.  Diplomatically, the Philippines has employed a balancing strategy by 
lobbying other ASEAN member states to unify as a bloc to balance against China. 
For example, on his official visit to Indonesia on March 8th, President Aquino 
stated that, “There is no room for unilateral action in that particular region [the 
Spratly Islands+” (Simamora, 2011). Militarily, the Philippines reportedly had 
increased air and naval patrols in the SCS and had plans to upgrade Rancudo Air 
Field on Pag‐ Asa (Thitu) island (Laude, 2011). The Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) was allocated US $183 million in funds from the United States’ Capability 
Upgrade Program to purchase two offshore fast patrol boats, long range maritime 
aircraft, and surveillance and communication equipment including air defense 
58 
 
radar to better protect its territory (Reuters, 2011b). Recently, the US Coast Guard 
Cutter USCGC Hamilton was transferred to Philippine Navy in May 2011, signaling 
an important development in Philippine-US joint defense cooperation. According 
to Philippine Ambassador Cuisia, “*this+ project is an indication of the robust 
Philippine-US partnership and serves as an expression of the United States’ 
commitment to help the Philippines protect its maritime domain” (Alonso, 2011). 
Manila also expects to take delivery of three new Taiwan-manufactured multi-
purpose attack craft early in 2012 (Reuters, 2011a). All of this actitivity is clearly 
directed toward a perceived China threat. 
There have also been other significant regional reactions regarding the SCS 
disputes. Indonesia and India have called for greater collaboration and defense 
cooperation especially with regard to the growing Chinese naval footprint in the 
India Ocean (Pedrozo, 2010, P. 4). In a letter to the United Nations on July 8th 
2010, the Indonesian government, for the first time, formally challenged China’s 
claims to the SCS after an Indonesian patrol was forced to release Chinese 
fishermen by a Chinese warship (Weitz, 2011, P. 9).  
The increased tension in Sino-ASEAN relations is clearly evident in the sustained 
military build-ups commencing in various Southeast ASEAN countries. This was 
true even during the years when China appeared more benign toward its 
neighbors. The value of major conventional weapons systems delivered to ASEAN 
countries almost doubled from 2005 to 2009. Malaysia imported approximately 
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722 percent more arms during this period than it did during the previous five 
years. The increase for Singapore was 146 percent while that of Indonesia was 84 
percent (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010). In short, most 
of ASEAN countries significantly built up their military capabilities recently as a 
hedging strategy against growing Chinese power. If recent policy trends in 
Vietnam are indicative, it is fair to conclude that the ASEAN countries have 
intensified their view that China is a rising strategic threat.     
Conclusion 
Analysis of empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicates that ASEAN 
countries, particularly Vietnam, now views China as an offensive power in 
Southeast Asia. China’s recent behavior has undermined its image as a good 
neighbor which was intact from 1989-2009. ASEAN member states’ evolving 
diplomatic approaches indicate that these states now view China as a greater 
threat to regional stability. 
Hanoi’s diplomatic approach in response to Chinese recent moves is startling. 
Indeed, the declarations of Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet to “sacrifice 
everything to protect our homeland our sea and island sovereignty” are really 
remarkable. Also, Vietnam’s two live-fire exercises conducted in June 2011 further 
illustrated this country’s determination to respond to mounting tension in Sino-
Vietnam relations.  
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In short, recent diplomatic initiatives and security behavior of key ASEAN 
countries show that China is increasingly viewed in Southeast Asia as a threat and 
that any era of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ has come to an end.  A new period of 
Chinese offensive behavior is challenging how any new regional order will be 
shaped.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
China’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia has substantially changed since the end of 
the Cold War. While China’s stance towards Southeast Asian countries during the 
Cold War was frequently antagonistic and confrontational, its diplomatic approach 
in Southeast Asia during the period of 1989-2009 became less aggressive. Beijing’s 
moves to resolve territorial disputes in the SCS such as the bilateral maritime 
boundary agreement with Vietnam in 2001, its signing of the “Declaration of 
Conduct in the South China Sea” with ASEAN in 2002 and its adherence to the 
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 prompted many analysts to view 
China as a good neighbor and stabilizing force for Southeast Asia. According to 
constructivists, Beijing transformed its identity from norm-avoiding to norm-
affirming behavior in its relations with Southeast Asian states during the 1989-
2009 timeframe. It was this change of identity, they argued, that led Beijing to 
have a strong desire to maintain close relationship and become involved in 
regional cooperation with its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
These arguments, however, are misleading because evidence shows that China’s 
employment of good neighbor policy in Southeast Asian region during this period 
was not due to a change in China’s identity but driven by pragmatic self-interest. 
Beijing could not act aggressively during 1989-2009 because of three serious 
constraints: (1) the limitation of China’s power projection capabilities in the SCS, 
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(2) the US factor, and (3) economic development as a top priority for China during 
this period.  
The period of 2010-2011 saw another substantial change in China’s foreign policy 
in the SCS. Beijing reportedly claimed the SCS as its ‘core interest’. Needless to 
say, this claim has elevated the importance of this area in a way that Beijing would 
protect it by all costs including the possibility of using force in resolving the 
disputes. This claim was followed by a series of dangerous unilateral moves on the 
part of China such as its warnings against any oil exploration in disputed waters, 
its launch of the Varyag carrier, and others. Why was there such a dramatic 
change in China’s diplomatic approach regarding the SCS disputes? Constructivists 
remain silent in answering this question.  
China acted aggressively during this period because there was a dramatic growth 
of its naval power in the SCS. Firstly, power projection capabilities of Chinese navy 
enhanced significantly. However, to some analysts, Chinese growing military 
power does not simply mean that Beijing is seeking hegemony. In other words, 
they claim that even though China builds a large navy, if the intention is defensive, 
its behavior will be peaceful. In contrast, even while the China’s navy is weak, if 
the intention is expansionistic and offensive, its behavior will be more aggressive. 
Then, which is a reliable indicator showing that Chinese intention is offensive or 
defensive? Public statements are largely unreliable indicators of foreign policy 
intention. Beijing’s foreign policy itself is also an unreliable indicator because its 
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foreign policy is precisely the phenomenon that we need to explain. The only best 
way to determine whether a state’s intention is offensive or defensive is to look at 
its military capabilities. Put simply, if its forces are largely defensive in nature, 
then that state's intention is probably defensive. If they are offensive, then that 
state's intention is most likely not defensive. It is therefore crucial to look at 
China’s developments of aircraft carriers – quintessential instruments of power 
projection. By studying China’s recent behavior in the South China Sea as well as 
recent developments in China’s carrier procurement, one can affirm that Beijing’s 
intention is truly offensive and China’s aircraft carriers would most likely be 
employed in the SCS.  
The US still remains a decisive factor shaping Beijing’s policy in the SCS. Recent 
developments in China’s missiles force strongly indicate that Beijing is committed 
over the long-term to securing the capability to win any region-wide campaign it 
wages against the US Navy. This growing military capability has, in turn, built up 
Beijing’s confidence, leading China to further press its territorial claims in the SCS. 
In short, realist strategy led Beijing to adopt a good neighbor policy in the period 
of 1989-2009 as well as a more aggressive diplomatic approach during the period 
of 2010-2011. 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter Four further supports the main 
arguments and hypotheses of this case study. Clearly, China’s recent and 
increasingly aggressive postures in the SCS led many ASEAN states to view China 
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as a rising threat. Recent diplomatic approaches and security behavior of ASEAN 
countries - especially those of Vietnam - adequately illustrate a crucial change in 
ASEAN’s perceptions of China from one of a good neighbor to one equating to a 
rising threat. 
The findings of this study support the validity of an offensive realist approach in 
analyzing Chinese foreign policy in the SCS since the end of the Cold War. 
Constructivists argue that China employed its good neighbor policy in Southeast 
Asia because it was socialized during interaction with ASEAN member states. They 
believe that China changed from norm-avoiding to norm-affirming behavior in its 
relations with Southeast Asian states.  
As argued previously, this argument, however, can be contested in three ways. 
Firstly, constructivists fail to indicate reliable indicators to observe and measure 
the transformation of China’s identity. Secondly, it is not persuasive to claim that 
China’s good neighbor policy is motivated by China’s change of identity because 
this policy could also be motivated by other factors especially its national 
interests. Thirdly, constructivists fail to explain why there was a crucial change in 
Chinese diplomatic approach in Southeast Asian region from a good neighbor 
policy to a more assertive and dangerously aggressive approach. In short, 
constructivists do not recognize that China is a highly motivated realist actor 
which carefully weighs the risks and costs before acting. Beijing will change the 
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existing balance of power in its favor if the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
costs.  
The offensive realist approach, on the other hand, anticipates China setting a high 
premium on the utility of force and looking for opportunities to maximize its 
relative power. As such, recent aggressive moves on the part of China can be 
better explained as a result of a change in distribution of power between China 
and other claimants in the SCS disputes.      
The findings of this case study also support the utility and validity of an offensive 
realist approach in world politics generally. In other words, this case study 
supports Mearsheimer’s argument that the goal of each state is to maximise its 
share of world power. It supports the argument that a great power is likely to 
behave more aggressively when it has a marked power advantage over its rivals. 
On the contrary, it will be very careful and concerned with defending the existing 
balance of power when it is in a disadvantaged position or facing powerful 
opponents.  
Practically, it could be inferred from the findings of this case study that, China, as a 
rising calculated great power, would probably again adjust its diplomatic approach 
in the SCS in a friendlier way sometimes in the future. However, one should 
always remember that Beijing is unlikely to compromise on its goal to maximize 
power or to forfeit its ultimate aim of becoming a regional hegemon. 
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